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NAFrA: The Effect of the Motor Carrier
Provisions on the Future of the
Agreement
By PAMELA C. SCHMIDT:
I. Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 is
designed to decrease trade barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States and encourage economic growth in all three countries.2
Since the date of its inception, NAFTA has sparked fierce contro-
versy. Proponents of the Agreement claim NAFTA is necessary if
North America wishes to remain competitive with its European coun-
terparts.3 NAFTA advocates also maintain that the Agreement will
increase United States exports, increase jobs, and improve the stan-
dard of living for agricultural workers in Mexico and the United
States. Conversely, opponents of NAFTA suggest that the Agreement
will undermine environmental regulations, export jobs to Mexico, and
result in a myriad of domestic problems. Although it may be too soon
to speculate on the long-term economic effects of the Agreement, it is
unquestionable that NAFTA will continue to cause a great deal of
controversy. From economists to politicians and lobbyists, everyone
seems to have an opinion on the future and fate of NAFTA.
One particular section of NAFTA is threatening to undermine
the entire Agreement. The motor carrier, or trucking, provisions of
NAFTA provide for a gradual phase-in that will eventually allow
Mexican trucks unfettered access to the highways of the United
* Member of the Class of 1997. B.A., with honors, University of California, Santa
Barbara.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat.
2057, 32 LL.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. See generally John Thomure, Jr., The Uneasy Case for te North American Free
Trade Agreement, 21 SYRACUSE J. INr'L L. & Com. 181 (1995).
3. Id.
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States.4 The first phase of the motor carrier provisions were sched-
uled to go into effect on December 18, 1995.5 The Agreement pro-
vides that three years after the signing of NAFTA on December 17,
1995, a presidential order shall be issued to allow Mexican trucking
companies access into the U.S. border states.
6
When the December 18 deadline came and passed, Mexican offi-
cials claimed that the unilateral delay of the motor carrier provisions
by the Clinton administration violated the Agreement.7 On the other
hand, many grass roots organizations, including the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (the "Teamsters Union"), considered the
delay a victory.8 Although safety concerns appear to be at the fore-
front of the controversy,9 other factors such as election-year politics10
and protectionist behavior 1 have been cited as major reasons for the
delay.
Although the motor carrier provisions are just a small part of
NAFTA, they have the ability to undermine the entire Agreement.
This Note will examine the advantages and disadvantages of imple-
menting the NAFTA motor carrier provisions. By weighing the po-
tential economic benefits to the United States against the possible
detriments in terms of safety and cost, a more accurate assessment of
the motor carrier provisions can be made. However, evaluating the
motor carrier provisions, without also examining the international im-
plications of a decision by the United States to permanently suspend
the motor carrier provisions, would reach an unfair result.
In addition, it is necessary to examine the legislation and other
state projects that are being tied to the NAFrA trucking provisions in
order to determine the far-reaching effects that implementation may
have. Finally, in the event that no consensus is reached between the
United States and Mexico, the Chapter 20 dispute resolution process
4. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (implementing NAFTA into United States law) (codified at 19 U.S.C,
§§ 3301-3473 (1994)) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act].
5. Id ch. 12(b)(3).
6. Id
7. Diane Lindquist, NAFTA Road Proves Bumpy, Officials Try to Arrive at Truck
Safety Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., June 19, 1996, at C-1.
8. See id
9. fd.
10. Robert H. Gettlin, NAFTA Inspires NAI Push for Tighter Truck Rules, Best's
Rev., Sept. 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Brprop File.
11. Nancy Nusser, Mexico: U.S. Lags on NAFTA, Trucking Ban, Tomato Tariff Have
Mexicans Wondering if Free Trade is Part of the Pact, AUSTIN AM.-SATESMAN, Jan. 13,
1996, at A3.
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will be tested. This could have disproportionate effects on the entire
NAFTA agreement, as well as the means by which dispute resolution
provisions are negotiated and written in the future.
H. Background
NAFTA designated the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
to initiate rulemaking proceedings to implement the various phases of
motor carrier access.12 The NAFTA Implementation Act provides
that three years after the signing of NAFTA, the ICC should institute
a rule making proceeding permitting Mexican trucking companies' ap-
plications for operating authority to engage in point-to-point com-
merce between Mexico and the U.S. border states. 13  The
Implementation Act further provides that the ICC is to
maintain a compliance monitoring program with the assistance of
the Department of Transportation, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, the Treasury Department, and the states, to ensure that
Mexican carriers operate only within the commercial zones for the
first three years after NAFrA [is] signed, and thereafter in the bor-
der states until the beginning of the sixth year that NAFTA is in
effect.1
4
The second phase of the motor carrier provisions is scheduled to
begin on December 17,1998.1s The NAFTA Implementation Act pro-
vides that six years after NAFTA is entered into force, a presidential
order will be issued to provide for cross-border trucking services
throughout the United States.' 6 In conjunction with this schedule of
liberalization, the ICC will institute a rule-making procedure in order
to allow Mexican trucking firms to operate between points in Mexico
and points in the United States.' 7 Whether this portion of the Agree-
ment is implemented depends largely upon how the United States
deals construes first phase of the motor carrier provisions.
Many citizens and lobbying groups who have criticized NAFTA
from its inception, are particularly opposed the motor carrier provi-
12. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 4, at ch. 12(b)(3). When the Interstate
Commerce Commission closed last year, its authority to regulate the zones it created in the
U.S. border cities was transferred to the U.S. Department of Transportation. Debra
Beachy, Mexican Trucks in State Freely; Poll Says Terans See Safety Threats, HousToN
CHRON., Mar. 9, 1996, at 1.
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sions.18 One such group, Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways
(CRASH), publicly opposed NAFTA and took the lead in campaign-
ing against the opening of the U.S. borders. 19 CRASH argues that the
increase of heavy trucks on the highway is likely to result in increased
environmental pollution, the deterioration of roads and bridges, and
increases in highway deaths and injuries.2 °
The difficulty of finding compatible truck safety standards be-
tween Mexico, Canada, and the United States is cited aS another rea-
son the December 18 deadline passed without presidential action. 1
Many critics suggest that NAFTA's requirement of "harmonization" is
impractical and will result in lower U.S. standards.22 'The process of
harmonization requires countries to make compatible, over a period
of three years, their respective safety standards and regulations relat-
ing to motor carrier operation.23 This includes harmonization of such
items as: Vehicle size and weight; equipment such as tires and brakes,
maintenance and repair; testing and licensing of truck drivers; medical
standards for truck drivers, standards for the transportation of hazard-
ous materials; road signs; and supervision of motor carrier safety com-
pliance.2 4 The Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, which
is comprised of lower level representatives from each country, was
created by NAFTA to achieve their goal of harmonization 5 The
schedule for standards of harmonization is as follows: One and one-
half years for nonmedical driver standards and drug or alcohol testing;
two and one-half years for medical driver standards; and three years
for size or weight, "conspicuity," securing cargo, and hours of
service.26
The initial suspension of the trucking provisions by U.S. Secre-
tary of Transportation Federico Pefia is also due, in part, to the activi-
18. CrrZENS FOR RELIABLE AND SAFE HIGHWAYS, CRASH ACc:OMPLISHMENTS 1
(1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter CRASH ACCOMPLISHMENTS].
19. Id
20. CITIZENS FOR RELIABLE AND SAFE HIGHWAYS, CRASH, NAFTA, and Heavy
Truck Traffic 1 (1995) (on file with author).
21. CmZENS FOR RELIABLE AND SAFE HIGHWAYS, CRASH, NAFTA: The North
American Free Trade Agreement is More Than Just A Trade Agreement 1 (1995) (on file
with author) [hereinafter CRASH, NAFTA MoPE THAN JUST A TRADE AGREEMENT].
22. Id.
23. Id at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id at n.1.
26. Wilson Favors Entry for Mexican Trucks; State is Offered as Tes'ing Ground, SAN
DIEGO UraoN-TRiB., Oct. 9, 1996, at C-2.
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ties of the legal department of the Teamsters Union.2 7 The Teamsters
filed a lawsuit in federal court, claiming that implementation of the
trucking provisions will cause a serious threat to the health and safety
of U.S. citizens.", A key Teamster official stated that the lawsuit is his
organization's attempt to delay the trucking provisions, as well as hold
up the rest of NAFTA. 29
The future of the motor carrier provisions is of the utmost impor-
tance to the success of NAFTA. The motor carrier provisions are an
example of a mandatory agreement between the United States and
Mexico, which has effectively been breached by the United States.
The delay of the trucking provisions marked the first interruption of
the NAFTA timetable, and it endangers puts the rest of the phase-in
provisions.3" The outcome of this dispute over border access may
have widespread effects on the willingness of both allies and neighbors
to enter into trade agreements with the United States if the United
States demonstrates its willingness to unilaterally suspend application
of mandatory agreement provisions.
The legal community is reacting to this dispute by proposing new
legislation that ties the trucking provisions to drug trafficking and
drug prevention.31 Also under consideration is a proposal to turn In-
terstate Highway 35 into a "computerized highway" using a fiber-optic
cable.32 Proponents hope that the creation of the superhighway wil
reduce the opportunity for unauthorized stops and reduce unneces-
sary delay.33 Foremost among the concerns regarding this system,
however, is who would bear the costs.3' Similarly, residents and poli-
ticians of many border states are claiming that it is unfair that they
must disproportionately absorb the costs to maintain the safety and
upkeep of their highways as a result of increased traffic from
NAFTA.35 The conflict between the states and the federal govern-
27. Diane Lindquist, Teamsters Try and Put Brakes on All of NAFTA, SAN DIEGO




31. Bill Would Link NAFTA to Anti-Drug Efforts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 1,
1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Dlabrt File.
32. William Ryberg, Technology, Inland Customs Stops Could Make 1-35 AFTA Su-
perhighway, DES MoIts REG., Dec. 20, 1995, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Matt Kelley, Group Stumps For Wired Highway Cable System Would Track Truck
on 1-35, OmAHA WoRLD HEP-ALD, Jan. 28, 1996, at IM.
35. Gettlin, supra note 10.
1997]
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ment over the funding and enforcement of the motor carrier provi-
sions is a dispute that is likely to continue for some time.
III. Problems With Implementation
A. Safety
Critics of NAFTA fear that potential road safety issues may arise
if U.S. standards are relaxed. Opponents claim the NA FTA harmoni-
zation process encourages the trucking industry and others to cut back
recent gains in highway safety.3 6 While Canada, Mexico, and the
United States have been negotiating in an attempt to harmonize, there
has yet to be any agreement. Because the United States has the low-
est size and weight limits of the three NAFTA countries, it is feared
that the United States will feel pressure to raise U.S. lmits closer to
the higher Canadian and Mexican limits. 37 A recent letter to U.S. Sec-
retary of Transportation Federico Pefia, which was signed by 231
members of the House of Representatives and 57 U.S. Senators, asked
Pefia to ensure that U.S. safety standards will not be compromised
during the harmonization discussion.38 With almost 75% of the $100
billion in U.S. trade with Mexico being delivered by truck, the overall
effect of a change in regulations would be substantial.39 In addition to
this statistic, more than a quarter of the approximately five thousand
Mexican trucks crossing into Texas every day carry corrosives, chemi-
cals, explosives, jet fuel, and pesticides.4
0
The United States currently has the lowest commercial truck size
and weight limits of all three of the countries.41 The maximum gross
weight that is permitted in Canada is 137,800 pounds and in Mexico
the maximum gross weight is 171,000 pounds.4 2 However, in the
United States, the maximum gross weight is 80,000 pounds.4 3 The
standards for limiting the number of hours a driver may be on the
road also vary significantly between the three countries.44 In the
36. CRASH, NAFTA: THE NORTH AmERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IS MORE
THAN JUST A TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 21, at 3.
37. Id.
38. Susan Lilly, Keep Truck Limits, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 11, 1996, at A10.
39. Howard Chua-Eoan, NAFTA is About to Unleash Unsafe Mexican Trucks That
May Become a Nightmare for Border States, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at 52.
40. I
41. Robert Whereatt, Highway Safety; NAFTA: A Threat to U.S. Drivers, STAR TRw.,
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United States, ten hours is the maximum consecutive number of hours
of driving that is allowable.4 5 Canada is slightly less restrictive with a
limit of thirteen hours, while in Mexico, there are no limits on the
number of hours a commercial driver may be behind the wheel. 46 The
United States is the only country that requires random drug and alco-
hol testing of its truck drivers.47 Mexican truckers are exempt from
testing in the United States under NAFTA. 48
The primary concern of those opposed to the trucking provisions
is that the number of deaths and serious injuries will rise substantially
if standards are relaxed.4 9 Even with substantially more stringent
standards, in the United States in 1994 5112 people died as a result of
accidents involving large trucks.50
In response to the recent criticism, the United States has pro-
posed creating a safety consultation board.5 ' The board would allow
each government to conduct background checks on companies seek-
ing operating authority.52 While this proposal may mitigate the con-
cerns of some individuals with regard to safety, it is not likely to
alleviate the anxiety felt by opponents of NAFTA as this does not
address the lower safety standards.
B. Enforcement
Even if there is an agreement on standards between the three
countries, whether these standards can and will be enforced presents
another heated issue. Preventing violations by Mexican and Canadian
truckers rests on the efforts of a myriad of state and federal agen-
cies.5 3 The U.S. Customs Service's responsibility at the border of
Mexico is to inspect certain documents for compliance with U.S. De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) and ICC regulations. The Office
of Motor Carrier Safety (OMCS) is responsible for conducting a lim-
ited number of truck and driver inspections, but OMCS officials con-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Chua-Eoan, supra note 39, at 53.
48. Debra Beachy, Danger: Free Trade Zone Ahead; State Officials Worry About the
Influx of Mexican Trucks, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 24, 1995, at 1.
49. See generally Whereatt, supra note 41, at 3B.
50. Id.
51. Kevin G. Hall, U.S., Mexico Trucks Could Face Safety Checks, DEN,-R POST, Feb.
24, 1996, at C-9.
52. Id.
53. CRASH, NAFTA is MoRE THAN JUST A TRADE AGREEM.Tr, supra note 21, at
54. Id. at n38.
1997]
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centrate primarily on safety "fitness" reviews undertaken at motor
carrier base facilities.55 Additionally, the Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance (CVSA) works with the government and industry to provide
guidelines for uniformity and to enforce motor carrier ltws.5 6 Finally,
state and local police, which are funded in part by the Federal High-
way Administration (FHWA) Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Pro-
gram, have the primary responsibility for enforcing truck safety
regulations in the states.57
While many trucks may keep within the Agreement guidelines,
the volume makes it virtually impossible for authorities to monitor the
trucks closely5 For example, just 150 of the 5000 trucks that come
into Texas daily are inspected.5 9 Less than five percent of the trucks
that are stopped for inspection in Texas meet U.S. safety require-
ments.6 0 A recent report indicates that of 12,462 trucks inspected be-
tween December 1995 and April 1996, half were removed from
service because of dangerous safety violations.6' Critics contend that
the present level of enforcement by U.S. authorities provides little as-
surance that compliance with the NAFTA motor carrer provisions
will be adequate to protect U.S. motorists.62 If enforcement efforts
fail, there is a distinct possibility NAFTA motor carrier provisions will
effectively allow Mexican trucks to operate within the United States in
violation of U.S. law.
C. Funding
If proper enforcement is the only way to ensure safety and fair-
ness to U.S. citizens, the next question must be who should bear the
cost. If the borders are opened, Texas is expected to get most of the
traffic.63 According to the DOT, this means that Texa:s should bear




58. Chua-Eoan, supra note 39, at 53.
59. Mark Potok, Critics: NAFTA Rule Ushers in Unsafe Trucks, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec.
18, 1995, at 3A.
60. Suzanne Gamboa, Group Says Mexico Trucks Pose Danger; Substandard Rigs Will
Place Lives at Risk When NAFTA Opens Highways Monday, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Dec. 13, 1995, at B1.
61. Truck Safety Down Due to NAFTA, DOTAlleges, DAILY REc., June 28,1996, at 1.
62. CRASH, NAFTA is MoRE THAN JUST A TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 21, at 9.
63. Whereatt, supra note 41, at 3B.
64. See Jeffrey Hoffnan, Mexico Trucks Spur Safety Fears, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 17, 1995, at 45A.
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already provides significant funds for enforcement and some person-
nel. But they say the state bears ultimate responsibility to patrol
Texas highways. 65
In addition to costs for enforcement, the state is also required to
maintain their highways for the safety of their citizens. Damage to
U.S. roads and highways is directly tied to the amount of weight a
truck is allowed to carry.66 Frank McCullough, director of the Univer-
sity of Texas Center for Transportation Studies, noted that "if you
double the load [of a truck], the road damage increases sixteen
times."'67 The amount of additional money that states will be required
to spend on the maintenance and upkeep of their roads is proportion-
ate to the change in weight limits under NAFTA.63 According to a
similar study by researchers at Texas A&M International University,
the average life of a Texas highway would be reduced from forty to
twelve years if trucks were permitted to carry loads as heavy as those
that are allowed in Mexico.69
Clearly, the most significant aspect in the equation of road safety
is federal funding. The federal government is drastically reducing the
money it gives to states.70 This trend is likely to continue if Congress
maintains its "slash-government" ideology.71 Because the federal gov-
ernment has historically provided the states with adequate highway
funding, many states do not have a great deal of room in their budget
for transportation costs.72 Major Lester Mills, the head of the Depart-
ment of Public Safety's 73 commercial vehicle enforcement notes that if
Mexican truck traffic increases as projected, "it places a huge burden
on state resources. This is a federal problem, this is international com-
merce coming across. If the federal government can't provide the per-
sonnel, they should at least provide the funding."74 Moreover, some
65. Id.





70. Dennis Wall, Highways: Lack of Funding Has Taken Its Toll, NEW MEXIco Bus. J.,
Jan. 1996, at A-2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Hoffman, supra note 64, at 45A. The Department of Public Safety will shoulder
much of the responsibility for regulating Mexican trucks. Id.
74. Id.
1997]
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U.S. officials consider the NAFrA provisions to be unfunded federal
mandates, which increase expenses to local and state governments. 7
There are currently a number of proposals that are aimed at alle-
viating the financial strain on states and ensuring that the NAFTA
motor carrier provisions are ushered in with success. One such propo-
sal is the NAFTA "superhighway." This proposal is supported by the
1-35 Corridor Coalition, a group of states, counties, and municipalities
located along Interstate 35 between Laredo, Texas and Duluth, Min-
nesota.76 The Corridor Coalition is pushing for a system that tracks
trucks moving along 1-35, using a fiber-optic cable running the length
of the roads.77 The primary purpose of the superhighway would be to
provide better management of vehicle fleets,78 by preventing un-
monitored stops. Also, it has been suggested that drug trafficking
would decrease, because of prohibitions on unscheduled detours and
inspection of truck containers.79 The system is also designed to help
alleviate some of the financial burden placed on the states. Moreover,
Congress recently designated 1-35 as a high priority highway, making
it first in line for federal funding. 0 Those in favor of the superhigh-
way proposal claim that it has the potential to create jobs, stimulate
economic growth, and stem drug trafficking.8' On the other hand,
many opponents are claiming that the increased weight limits that
may be allowed on the corridor82 will result in more sa:.ety problems
and greater damage to roads than the increased federal funding will
accommodate.
8 3
Opposition to the motor carrier provisions is not only limited to
U.S. truckers and safety gurus. The National Association of In-
dependent Insurers (NAII)84 also opposes the motor carrier provi-
sions. NAIl warns that U.S. insurers will end up paying more accident
75. See Gettlin, supra note 10.
76. Kelley, supra note 34, at 1M.
77. Id.
78. Ryberg, supra note 32, at 1.
79. Timothy O'Leary, Driving Home the Need for Free-Trade Road, DALLAS MORN.
ING NEws, Sept. 4, 1995, at 27A.
80. Kelley, supra note 34, at 1M.
81. See O'Leary, supra note 79, at 27A.
82. Ryberg, supra note 32, at 1. Trucks on the highway could eventually be much
larger and heavier than current vehicles. They could have: weights of 175,000 pounds,
rather than 80,000, nine axles instead of four, and triple trailers, instead of the single or
double trailers now seen on highways. Id.
83. See Gamboa, supra note 60, at B1.
84. The NAIl represents companies that write about one-third of the motor carrier
coverage in the United States. See Gettlin, supra note 10.
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claims as a result of unsafe Mexican trucks on U.S. highways85 Ri-
cardo Cator, a practitioner in the area of product liability and insur-
ance coverage, predicts that third party liability claims are also likely
to increase as a result of the sheer number of uninsured vehicles on
Mexican roads and the unfamiliarity of U.S. drivers with Mexican
driving conditions.8 6 In the hope of avoiding the predicted increases
in costs, the NAII has been lobbying in support of a California Repub-
lican congressman's proposal for federal grant money and loan guar-
antees to help border states improve roads and properly enforce
motor carrier laws.' The effort by NAIl and others is an attempt to
remind the federal government that NAFTA is a national priority and
funding should not rest disproportionately with the states.?
IV. The Suspension of the Motor Carrier Provisions May
Change the Role of the United States in
International Agreements
A. International Backlash
If implemented, the NAFTA motor carrier provisions would ar-
guably provide a number of benefits to the states. Proponents have
predicted that allowing Mexican trucking companies access to U.S.
highways will provide more jobs for U.S. citizens.89 Similarly, it is ex-
pected that the economy of towns along 1-35, the main route between
Mexico, the United States, and Canada, will prosper.90
However, if the motor carrier provisions are suspended indefi-
nitely, the loss of these "potential" benefits will be of secondary con-
cern to the United States. There already exists the threat that the
failure to implement the trucking provisions is setting a dangerous
precedent. 91 U.S. House of Representatives member Jim Kolber
noted that suspending the motor carrier provisions threatens "the
leadership position of the United States on trade liberalization and
economic issues throughout the Western Hemisphere." 92 As such, the
85. Id.
86. Ricardo J. Cata, Emerging Markets Liability in Latin America, 27 U. MM.iI IN.
TER-AMf. L. REv., 509, 522 (1996).
87. Gettlin, supra note 10.
88. See id.
89. Ryberg, supra note 32, at 1.
90. Id.
91. Rosella Brevetti, NAFTA: Key GOP Members Question Decision to Delay Mexico
Trucking Provisions, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 43 (Jan. 10, 1996).
92. Id.
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sanctity of the trade agreement is something the United States must
preserve.
Mexico claims that the failure of the United States to meet the
December 18 deadlines constitutes protectionist behavior.93 This is
having profound effects on the rest of the Agreement. For example,
the Clinton administration recently proposed changing the way Mexi-
can tomato imports to the United States are counted.94 Notwithstand-
ing the problems with the motor carrier provisions, this proposal may
have gone virtually unnoticed. However, in light of the other road-
blocks in the Agreement, the maneuver is generating a great deal of
controversy.95 Some commentators have predicted that: "the U.S. ac-
tion could prove damaging to America's long-term economic interests
if it prompts the Mexican government to retaliate by reneging or drag-
ging its feet on other NAFTA provisions to lower trade barriers. '96
This prediction has proven true, as Mexico recently confirmed its in-
tent to keep new package-express regulations on hold until the Clin-
ton administration reverses its decision not to honor the NAFTA
motor carrier provisions.97 As a result of the delay, it will be very
difficult to demand that Mexico live up to its NAFTA commitments
when the United States cannot live up to theirs.98
It is suggested that the United States' refusal to implement the
motor carrier provisions undermines our international credibility and
our long-term economic growth. 99 Former U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor noted that in the past thirty-six months, Washington
has reached 183 trade agreements. 1" ° Kantor stated that "[t]hese
pacts have helped send exports soaring by 10 percent in 1994 and 16
percent in 1995, but the 'sheer number and scope' . . . creates the
potential for trading partners to violate them."''1 Ironically, Repre-
sentative Kantor expressed this concern during a speech at the Center
93. Nusser, supra note 11, at A3.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. A NAFTA Detour, Clinton Delays Access for Mexican Trucks, PrrrsBURG;H POST-
GAZETtE, Jan. 2, 1996, at A6.
97. Kevin G. Hall, Mexico's New Package Rules Held Hostage to NAFTA Dispute, J.
CoM., Sept. 10, 1996, at B-2.
98. Pena Announces Delay in NAFTA Crossings, HAzNtT TRANSPORT NEWS, Jan. 1,
1996, at 1, available in WESTLAW, Buspub Database.
99. Thomas Donohue, Put NAFTA To Work, Let Mexico's Trucks on U.S. Highways,
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for National Trade Policy where the subject was "Enforcement of
Trade Agreements." 102
During his speech, Representative Kantor emphasized the impor-
tance of enforcing trade laws and trade agreements, stressing that "the
United States makes it clear we will enforce our trade agreements;
countries are on notice not to violate those agreements or our trade
laws."' 1 3 Kantor spoke on this issue only two and one-half weeks af-
ter the date the first phase of the motor carrier provisions was sched-
uled to be implemented.104 Thus, the United States is condemning the
violation of trade agreements, while condoning its own behavior with
respect to the motor carrier provisions.05
Additionally, if other countries do not trust the United States and
the stability of NAFTA, they may not wish to join the accord. The
United States is currently negotiating with Chile to become the new-
est member of NAFTA. 10 6 However, efforts to persuade other coun-
tries to join the Agreement may prove futile in light of this recent
dispute.
B. The Domestic Response
The relaxation of government controls over the flow of goods,
services, information, and capital results in an increase of both legal
and illegal economic activity.10 7 The drug problems between the
United States and Mexico are growing at an alarming rate.10 3 Be-
tween 1989 and the id-1990's, the percentage of cocaine that entered
the United States market through Mexico increased from 30 to
80%.109 It is also significant that most drugs reach the American mar-
ket not by plane or boat, but by way of commercial conveyances."'0
Arguably, Mexico is the new center for drug traffic, having replaced
102. See id.
103. Mickey Kantor, Speech by United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor at
the Center for National Trade Policy Breakfast, in Federal News Service, Jan. 5, 1996.
104. Paul Blustein, Trade Policing Unit Shows Clinton Shift; Administration Sends Get-
Tough Message, WASmt Pos-r, Jan. 6, 1996, at D1.
105. Id.
106. Thomure, supra note 2, at 120.
107. The Growing Threat of International Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 57 (1996) (testimony of
Peter Andreas, Research Fellow, The Brookings Institute) [hereinafter Andreas
Testimony].
108. Id.
109. Id. "Mexico also supplies about 20% of the heroin and 60% of the marijuana
consumed in the U.S." Id.
110. Id. at 3.
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Florida as the primary transfer point for drugs arriving from Colum-
bia."' The Mexican drug cartels are producing a large supply of black
tar heroin which is "vastly more profitable to export than Colombian
cocaine.""12 This has led critics to conclude that the concerns about
drug control should have been discussed during the NAFTA
negotiations." 3
On January 30, 1996, Senators Al D'Amato and Dianne Feinstein
introduced new legislation that is directly related to the trucking pro-
visions." 4 This legislation would deny applications from Mexican
trucking companies to enter the United States under the motor carrier
provisions unless the Mexican companies can prove they meet U.S.
safety standards and that Mexico is dealing with the issue of narcotics
trafficking." 5 D'Amato and Feinstein would pressure Mexico into
stepping up anti-drug trafficking efforts by: Suspending Mexican
trucking applications that do not meet U.S. safety requirements, tying
a six month extension of the $20 billion loan guarantee to the efforts,
and denying certification of Mexican compliance with anti-drug meas-
ures as required under the Foreign Assistance Act.1 6 The Teamsters
are supporting the legislation because they believe it exemplifies an-
other problem with NAFTA: increased drug traffic into the United
States through Mexican trucks."
7
Nonetheless, the Feinstein-D'Amato bill ties the drug problem to
NAFTA in a fashion not contemplated by the United States or Mex-
ico. In a three-page press statement, the Mexican Embassy in Wash-
ington stated, "Mexico opposes any measure that either links
unrelated issues or conditions compliance with previously-established
bilateral commitments to subjective and biased verifications of Mexi-
can government policies. '"1 8 In addition to the Feinstein-D'Amato
bill, other pending legislation ranges from anti-immigration proposals
111. James 0. Goldsborough, Feinstein's Misguided Anti-Mexico Legislation, SAN Di.
EGO UNION-TRm., Feb. 8, 1996, at Bll.
112. Dan Morales, Free Trade Can't Mean Unsafe Roads, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 19, 1995, at 6J.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Bill Would Link NAFTA to Anti-Drug Efforts, supra note 31, nt A-1.
115. Id.
116. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C § 2151. See also Bill Would Link Anti.
Drug Efforts, supra note 31, at A-1-
117. Bill Would Link Anti-Drug Effforts, supra note 31, at A-1.
118. NAFTA Round-Up-Senate Bill Links Truck Accord to Improved Mexican Drug
Efforts, LATIN AM. LAW & Bus. REP., Feb. 29, 1996, at 1.
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to a bill to renegotiate NAFTA. 119 Further evidence of NAFIA's
growing unpopularity is the NAFTA Accountability Act, which has
gathered several cosponsors from all sides of the political spectrum.YO
Critics argue that the relationship between the trucking provi-
sions and drugs is a potentially dangerous combination that should
have been addressed from the beginning of negotiations. Unfortu-
nately, at the time of NAFTA negotiations, the United States neither
confronted nor admitted the link between free market reform and
drug market prohibition.122 In fact, the administration promoted a
National Drug Control Strategy report which provided that "market-
oriented governments... are much easier to work with and more
willing to cooperate with the international community in a common
effort against the illicit drug industry."'123 This conclusion, however, is
not supported by the Latin American experience where free market
reforms have swept through the region and the illegal drug trade has
flourished.
1 24
The United States' failure to discuss drug control mechanisms
during the negotiation phase of NAFTA is a shortcoming of the
Agreement and the motor carrier provisions specifically.125 Nonethe-
less, omitting discussions of drug controls while negotiating economic
interests is a common practice in Washington.- 6 Congressional com-
mittees and government agencies may endlessly debate over the best
methods by which to curtail the drug supply. Similarly, those con-
cerned with market reform and the elimination of trade barriers talk
only of export earnings, inflation levels, and the pace of privatiza-
tion.2 7 However, other commentators claim the drug trade is an eco-
nomic activity that is intertwined with the legal economy.128
119. See generally Robert Collier, U.S. Mexico Stalemated on Drugs: Congress' Anger
Has Little Effect South of the Border, S.F. C-moN., Mar. 1, 1996, at 1.
120. H.R 2651, 104th Cong. (1995). See also Lawrence Mattera, Grading NAFTA;
Congress Wants Proof that Pact Meets Promises, PHoNL.x GAzETrE, Oct. 2, 1996, at B-5.
This bill highlights the idea that NAFTA promised numerous benefits to the American
people which have not all been realized. MR. 2651. If the administration fails to prove
that these goals have been met, the bill states that the United States must withdraw or
renegotiate NAFIA. Id.
121. Andreas Testimony, supra note 107.
122. Id. at 2.
123. ld.
124. Id.
125. See generally id. at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 5.
128. I&
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V. Dispute Resolution Under NAFrA: The Motor Carrier
Provisions May Test the Limits of the Chapter 20
Resolution Process
A number of problem areas exist in NAFTA's dispute resolution
scheme. 129 NAFTA's dispute resolution process is patterned after its
predecessor, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 130 as
well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT)131 and
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States. 132 As a result of the similarity
between the NAFTA and GATr dispute resolution processes, it can
be expected that NAFTA will be subject to much of the same time
delays and enforcement problems that exist in cases arising under
GATT. 133 If this holds true, parties engaging in dispute resolution
under NAFTA should expect significant delays in convening a panel
and further delays in enforcing panel decisions. 34 Article 2001 of
NAFFA establishes the Free Trade Commission (the "Commission"),
which supervises the implementation of NAFTA and oversees the
work of all committees and "resolve[s] disputes that may arise regard-
ing its interpretation or application."'
35
Article 2004 provides that if disputes arise between parties re-
garding an interpretation or application of the Agreement, the Chap-
ter 20 dispute resolution provisions apply. 36 Mexico invoked this
provision in response to the dispute over the motor carrier provi-
sions.'37 Chapter 20 of NAFTA establishes the mechanism whereby
parties can present disputes which involve an interpretation of
NAFTA or an alleged violation of NAFTrA. 138 Although Chapter 20
129. Thomure, supra note 2, at 114.
130. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M.
281.
131. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
132. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(1965).
133. Thomure, supra note 2, at 114 n.109 (citation omitted).
134. Id.
135. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2001.
136. Id.
137. See generally Brevetti, supra note 91, at 43.
138. Thomure, supra note 2, at 198 n.112. There are two additional dispute resolution
mechanisms in NAFTA which do not concern the motor carrier provisions. Id. The first is
Chapter 11, Subchapter B, which provides a mechanism for resolving disputes between a
party and an investor. Id. The second dispute mechanism is Chapter 19, which provides
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does not provide for any binding arbitration, 3 9 it does provide a gen-
eral framework for the settlement of disputes and focuses on the use
of dispute settlement panels.140
Under NAFTA, parties must use consultations and arbitration
prior to requesting NAFTA arbitral panel proceedings.1 4 ' Article
2006 provides that "[a]ny party may request in writing consultations
with any other party regarding any actual or proposed measure that it
considers might affect the operation of this agreement." 142 If the par-
ties cannot resolve the matter, usually within thirty days, any country
that participated in the consultations may refer the issue to the Com-
mission for resolution. 43 The language of the provision, however, in-
dicates that a party does not have an absolute right to have their claim
heard by the Commission.144 Article 2007(4) provides: "Unless it de-
cides otherwise, the Commission shall convene within ten days of the
delivery of the request."' 45 This language suggests an element of
voluntariness.
The panels that are responsible for the ultimate resolution of dis-
putes under NAFTA are comprised of five members.146 These panel-
ists are chosen from a group of thirty individuals who have previously
been nominated by their government.147 The disputing parties must
first agree on a chair for the panel, and then each party chooses two
panelists from the opposing party's country to serve as panelists. 1
4s
NAFTA also allows the panel to consult with experts to assist them in
rendering a decision. 49 On the request of a party or on its own initia-
tive, the panel may also request a written report of a scientific review
board "on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety
or other scientific matters raised by a disputing Party in a proceed-
ing.' 50 Thus, it is likely that experts and scientific evidence will play a
parties a mechanism for resolving disputes under the antidumping and countervailing duty
las. Id
139. Id.
140. Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA" Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and
the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DumK LJ. 216,223 (1995).
141. Id. at 224.
142. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2006.
143. Id. art. 2007.
144. Thomure, supra note 2, at 199 n.115.
145. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2007(4).
146. Id. art. 2011.
147. Id. art. 2009.
148. Straight, supra note 140, at 226.
149. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2014.
150. Id. art. 2015.
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significant role in the resolution of the dispute over the motor carrier
provisions.
After the panel makes a decision, it issues an initial report.' 5'
The purpose of the report is to allow disputing parties an opportunity
to review the panel's findings of fact and recommendations for resolv-
ing the dispute.152 Within thirty days of this initial report, the panel
must issue a final report which will be published fifteen days after it is
sent to the Commission. 53 Unlike GATT, NAFTA Chapter 20 does
not provide a method for appealing panel decisions. 54
The dispute between the United States and Mexico over the mo-
tor carrier provisions is likely to test the adequacy of the dispute reso-
lution process. In the early stages of disagreement, however, top
ranking officials underestimated the severity of the situation. 5 5 U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, referring to Mexico's request
for NAFTA consultations on the U.S. implementation of NAFTA
trucking provisions, stated he was "unaware of any action or proposed
action by the United States that could give rise to a request for consul-
tations under [NAFTA] Chapter 20." 156 Additionally, in a letter to
the Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development,
Kantor stated he was "perplexed" by the request for consultations.
5 7
Whether these statements were a political move designed to minimize
fallout in an election year, or merely a misguided notion of the far-
reaching effects of NAFTA, there is little doubt that confusion and
concern are paramount whenever Chapter 20 mechanisms are
employed.
In an attempt to avoid Chapter 20 consultations, the United
States agreed to informal discussions in Dallas, Texas on December
20, 1995.158 Nonetheless, the Mexican government made a formal
protest to the U.S. government over the trucking provisions.159 The
informal consultations were held in Washington on January 18, 1996
to January 19, 1996.160 Enrique Quintana, an economist, said that the
151. Straight, supra note 140, at 228.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 229.




159. Mexicans Query U.S. Trucking U-Turn, LATIN AM. NEWSLE1rERN;, Jan. 18, 1996, at
2.
160. Bill Would Link NAFTA to Anti-Drug Efforts, supra note 114, at A-1.
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Mexican government was correct to take such a strong position on the
motor carrier provisions because it could not allow the United States
to establish the precedent that they will not implement those portions
of NAFTA they find, in retrospect, unpopular.1 61 Assuming this is the
driving force behind Mexico's response to the trucking dispute, it is
likely that the United States will see the next stage of the dispute reso-
lution process tested unless a resolution can be reached.
The next step in the dispute resolution process is for Mexico to
ask the Commission to be convened.162 This is likely to start a debate
over whether the Commission may choose not to meet, as the literal
interpretation suggests. 163 Regardless of the outcome of that debate,
the critical issue is whether Mexico will choose to request an official
panel proceeding at all. If a panel convenes and reaches a decision,
the United States effectively has only two choices. Because there is
no court for review of panel decisions under Chapter 20,161 the United
States may either comply with the panel findings or breach the Agree-
ment. Although the parties are obligated to agree on the interpreta-
tion and application of NAFTA, there is no mechanism created to
actually enforce this language. 6 ' NAFTA provides that if the parties
do not agree with the recommendation of the panel, and cannot re-
solve a dispute within thirty days, the non-breaching party may sus-
pend the benefits of NAFTA. 6 6 Although the aggrieved party is
encouraged to suspend benefits in the sector where the violation oc-
curred, nothing prevents the party from suspending any and all provi-
sions as a result of the offense.
67
If the panel decides that the United States must comply with the
motor carrier provisions, there is a good chance that the United States
may ignore this ruling. Pressure from citizens groups such as CRASH,
and lobbying powers such as the Teamsters will have a great deal of
influence on the Administration. Mexico may choose to suspend
those provisions of NAFTA that will have the greatest domestic effect
on the United States, which may effectively put the entire Agreement
in jeopardy.
161. Mexicans Query U.S. Trucking U-Turn, supra note 159, at 2.
162. Id. at 2.
163. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2007(4).
164. Thomure, supra note 2, at 200.
165. Id. at n.126.
166. Id. at 200.
167. Id.
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VI. Conclusion
The controversy over the motor carrier provisions is the first real
setback facing NAFTA. Nonetheless, many of the questions and
problems brought to light as a result of the trucking provisions are
likely to resurface in other areas in the future. The motor carrier pro-
visions are representative of a bigger problem with NAFTA, the nego-
tiation process.
While it is somewhat easy to agree on the principle of free trade
and an open market, it is more difficult to agree on whose standards
should be relaxed and whose truck fleets should be replaced. If noth-
ing else, this dispute has hopefully taught us that the harmonization
process may actually produce confusion and anger rather than har-
mony. While it is not possible to agree on every detail, a greater effort
should be made in the future to come to some preliminary agreement
over safety and health issues, or to agree on "default provisions" that
would take effect in the event of an impasse.
It is also troublesome that the United States would fail to make
drug-control measures a topic in the negotiation of NAFTA. It is
likely that in the future we will see the economic and social effects of
drugs discussed contemporaneously with interest rates and economic
stability.
As a result of this dispute over border access, it is likely the dis-
pute resolution process will come under increasing polilical and legal
attack. The lack of a measure providing for review of panel discus-
sions effectively limits the options that the parties have. In addition, it
is not clear whether this lack of judicial review is even
constitutional. 16
Although there are certainly problems with the motor carrier
provisions, it is likely that more political, economic, and legal harm
may result if the United States does not follow through with their obli-
gations. NAFTA is an important national obligation. As the United
States considers expanding the membership of NAFTA to Chile
169
and other Latin American countries, it is important that the United
States honor its commitment to the Agreement and make every effort
to abide by the rules that it expects other countries to follow. In a
world with a global economy, the future and economic well-being of
this country may depend on the sanctity of NAFTA.
168. Id. at 200 n.125 (citation omitted).
169. Jennifer Graff, Economic Growth and Advances in Foreign Trade Accelerate
Chile's Infrastructure Needs, Bus. AM., Aug. 1996, at 21.
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